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MUNICIPAL COURTS IN TENNESSEE�A CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PRIMER 
This paper will first examine the constitutional and statutory underpin­
nings of municipal courts in Tennessee. Then it will briefly review the jurisi­
diction of municipal courts, the selection of municipal court judges, and 
municipal court penalties. Finally, it will take a look at the recent case of 
Summers v. Thompson, Tenn. Sup. Ct., No. 23, filed May 23, 1988. That case has 
a significant bearing on all of those topics, and it has some implications for 
what municipal courts will look like in the future. No pretense is made that 
'•Very important thing is said or every important case is cited on those topics. 
A certain amount of picking and choosing goes into every short treatment of any 
major subject. This paper is, as its title claims, only a primer. Supra, 
infra, etc., in citations are used sparingly, if at all, and page citations in 
cases have been omitted. 
An interesting observation in The Judicial System of Tennessee, published 
in 1971 by The Institute of Judicial Administration under a grant from the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration is appropriate here: 
In the exercise of judicial power by the incorporated munici­
palities of the state, almost infinite variety creeps in the 
treatment of traffic and other petty offenses. Tennessee, 
like many other states, has authorized municipal officers to 
try violations of municipal ordinances and minor state offen­
ses. But unlike some of them, it has enshrined the practice 
in its state constitution and failed to regulate the conduct 
o f  these courts by general law. As a result, there is a 
b ewildering variety of part-time officials presiding over 
municipal courts (usually at odd hours) and there is equally 
bewildering variety in the state law violations entrusted to 
their jurisdiction.· Some can impose jail sentences while 
others are limited to imposing fines for violations of city 
ordinances. Some have committing power in the case of major 
crimes so that they can bind defendants over for grand jury 
action; some cannot. 
The same observation could have been made in 1988. 
The Constitutional and Statutory Basis of Municipal Courts 
The Constitutional Basis 
Article VI, Section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that 
The judicial power of this State shall be vested in one 
Supreme Court and in such Circuit, Chancery and other 
inferior courts as the Legislature shall from time to time, 
ordain and establish; in the Judges thereof, and in Justices 
of the peace. The Legislature may also vest such juris­
diction in Corporation Courts as may be deemed necessary. 
Courts to be holden by Justices of the Peace may also be 
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)i!r�e "Corporation Courts" referred to in Art, VI, Section 1 are the courts of 
, :.'inunicipal corporations, Gregory v, City of Memphis, 1 57 Tenn, 68, 6 S.W,2d 332 
·' ( 1 927); Hill v. State ex rel Phillips, 216  Tenn. 503, 392 S,W.2d 950 (1965), 
The same is true of the metropolitan court established by the Nashville-Davidson 
County Metropolitan Charter, State ex rel Boone v, Torrence, 470 S,W,2d 356 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1971), 
A municipal court created by the legislature which has jurisdiction to hear 
only municipal charter and ordinance violation cases is a "corporation court" 
and not a "constitutional court" State v. Davis, 204 Tenn. 510,  322 s. W, 2d 214 
( 1 959); Summers v. Thompson, (Tenn, Sup. Ct,, No, 23, filed May 23, 1 988), 
The Statutory Basis 
T,C,A. 16-1-101  provide11 that 
The judicial power of the state is vested in the judges of 
the courts of general sessions, recorders of certain towns 
snd cities, county courts, circuit courts, criminal courts, 
common law and chancery courts, chancery courts, Court of 
Appeals, and the Supreme Court and other courts created by 
law. 
Municipal courts are authorized under this section to be created by the 
l egislature and under Article VI, Section l of the Tennessee Constitution. 
Deming v. Nichols, 1 35 Tenn, 295, 1 86 s.w. 1 1 3  (1916), 
As far as it can be determined, the legislature has authorized every muni­
cipality in Tennessee, through its charter or by statute, to establish a munici­
pal court. T,C.A. 1 6-17- 101 authorizes home rule municipalities to establish 
municipal courts, and in those home rule municipalities which already have a 
municipal court, to increase the number of divisions of the same, It is not 
clear whether this statute is supplemental and in addition to the authority 
granted in the charters of home rule municipalities to establish municipal 
c ou-rts, That issue will be. discussed in more detail in the sections on 
Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts, and Municipal Judges. T,C,A. 16- 1 8-101  
authorizes the governing body of any municipality having a mayor's or a 
recorder's court, and no other provision for a city judge, to provide by 
ordinance for the office of a city judge, 
Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts 
General 
The legislature may vest such jurisdiction in Corporation Courts as it may 
deem necessary. Article VI, Section l of the Tennessee Constitution. The 
legislature has deemed it necessary to give every municipal court the authority 
to hear ordinance violation cases. A few municipal courts have the authority to 
hear charter violation cases, although it is not clear how such cases are heard. 
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ge group of municipaliti·�s, possibly the majority of them, have the addi­
nal authority to exercise jurisdiction concurrent with that of justices of 
e peace or of courts of gen•aral sessions in criminal cases. Some charter pro­
iisions granting the municipal court concurrent jurisdiction expressly limit the 
concurrent jurisdiction to jurisdiction to hold preliminary hearings. ¥any 
municipal courts which have c,oncurrent jurisdiction do not exercise it. A 
municipality cannot exercise concurrent jurisdiction absent an express grant of 
authority by the General Assembly giving it such authority, Hill v. State ex 
rel Phillips, 216 Tenn. 503, 392 S.W,2d 950 (1965), 
Jurisdiction prescribed by the charter 
Some private act charters prescribe concurrent jurisdiction, others 
prescribe jurisdiction only in ordinance violation cases. Each private act 
municipal charter must be examined to determine the extent of the municipal 
court's jurisdiction. Under the general law mayor-aldermanic and modified city 
manager-council charters the municipal court has jurisdiction in ordinance 
violation cases and concurrent jurisdiction. T.C.A. 6-1-405, 6-2-403 and 
6-33-103, There are two classes of courts under the general law uniform city 
manager-commission charter: a small class falling within certain population 
brackets has jurisdiction in ordinance violation cases and concurrent juris­
diction, while the larger class has jurisdiction in only ordinance violation 
cases. T.C.A. 6-21-501. Municipal courts in home rule municipalities have 
jurisdiction in ordinance violation cases and concurrent jurisdiction (T,C,A. 
16-17-101 and 16-17-103), except for the municipal court in Knoxville whose con­
current jurisdiction was abolished by T,C,A, 40-4-121--40-4-124, City of 
Knoxville· ex rel Roach v. Dossett, 672 S.W.2d 193 (Tenn. 1984), 
A confusing aspect of municipal court Jurisdiction in home rule municipali­
ties is that many such municipalities have established municipal courts under 
provisions of their charters. Some of those provisions are not consistent with 
T.c.A. 16-17-101 et seq., which purports to govern the establishment of munici­
pal courts in "all" home rule munlcipalities, and the selection of municipal 
judges to staff those courts. What is not clear is whether T.c.A. 16-17-101 
supplements the authority granted home rule municipalities in their charters to 
establish municipal courts or whether it supercedes it. The Tennessee Attorney 
General has opined that an amendment to the Lenoir City Charter which gave the 
city judge jurisdiction to hear ordinance and charter violation cases and mis­
demeanors adopted from state laws is not the exclusive provision granting juris­
diction to municipal courts in home rule municipalities, that such municipalities 
also have concurrent jurisdiction under T.C.A. 16-17-101. OAG 85-047 (2/21/85). 
As will be pointed out in the section on Municipal Jud ges, the same opinion 
declares that a Lenoir City charter (home rule) amendment providing for the at 
will appointment of municipal judges was a violation of T.C.A. 16-17-102, and 
that the latter supercedes the former. 
l In all references to the judicial powers, duties, functions and 
jurisdiction of justices of the peace in the T.C.A. the term "justice of the 
peace" and any variation thereof was changed to "court of general session" or 
"judge of the court of general sessions" by T.c.A. 16-1-112, 
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The Limited Jurisdiction of Municipal Courts 
Without Concurrent Jurisdiction 
With respect to those municipal courts which do not have concurrent juris­
diction, the Tennessee Supreme Court said in the important case of Summers v. 
Thompson, Tenn. Sup. Ct., No. 23, filed May 23, 1988 
The jurisdiction of these city courts is wholly limited to 
traffic violations or violations of city ordinances, as the 
judges of these courts have no authority to impose fines 
exceeding $50 or to impose extensive terms of imprisonment 
and, as a practical matter, are essentially administrative 
judges, Such a judge is not cloaked with the powers of a 
judge of an inferior court within the meaning of Article VI, 
§ 6 [of the Tennessee Constitution). 
Some Statutory Contractions or Expansions of Jurisdiction 
The legislature has also seen fit to restrict the jurisdiction of municipal 
courts in certain traffic cases, Under T.C,A. 55-10-307, the fol l owing offenses 
are exclusively state offenses and must be tried in state court or a court 
having concurrent jurisdiction: driving while intoxicated or drugged, as prohi­
bited by T,C,A. 55-10-401; failing to stop after a traffic accident, as prohi­
bited by T,C,A. 55-10-101 et seq,; driving while license is suspended or 
revoked, as prohibited by T.C,A, 55-7-116; and drag racing, as prohibited by 
T,C.A. 55-10-501, 
Judges of juvenile courts are authorized to waiver jurisdiction over traf­
fic offenders over the age of sixteen and allow such cases to be heard by traf­
fic courts having jurisdiction of adult traffic violations. T,C, A, 37-1-146. 
Such courts undoubtedly include municipal courts presiding over the area in 
which the traffic offense occurred, 
Municipal Judges 
General 
The appointment and terms of municipal judges are prescribed by the munici­
pal charter. However, as th". last section in this paper, titled Summers v. 
Thompson, reflecting the impc:ortant Tennessee Supreme Court opinion of the same 
name, handed down May 23, 191':8 will point out, the at will appointment of muni­
cipal court judges, particularly those with concurrent jurisdiction, is under 
legal attack. 
Private Act Charters 
Presently, under privat•i act charters the municipal judge may be the mayor 
or the recorder, or another person selected by the governing body. In a few 
cases the municipal judge is elected by the voters, usual l y  for a short term. 
Some municipal judges appointed under private act charters are appointed 
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.. for a definite term and are removable only for cause; others serve at the will �of the governing body. The private act charter may or may not prescribe quali­
fications for the office. A common qualification is that the appointee be a 
licensed attorney. 
General Law Charters 
Under the general law mayor-aldermanic charter the ma yor or "The recorder 
or some other other proper designated officer" is the municipal judge, T.C.A. 
6-1-406 and T.C, A. 6-2-403. No term of office is specified. 
A city court is required to be established under the general law uniform 
city manager-commission charter, presided over by a city judge. T.C.A. 
6-21-501. In those cities having city courts with concurrent jurisdiction, the 
city judge is appointed by, and serves at the will of, the board of com­
missioners, and must be an attorney. T,C, A. 6-21-50l(b). In those cities with 
a city court having jurisdiction only over over ordinance violations, the city 
judge also serves at the will and pleasure of the board of commissioners, but 
the botnd sets his qualifications; or, if the board appoints no other person to 
fill the office of city judge, the the recorder serves that function. T, C.A. 
6-21-50l(a). The duties of the city judge and the operation of the court under 
the general law uniform manager-commission charter are set out in considerable 
detail in T.C.A. 6-21-502 through 6-21-508. 
Under the general law modified city manager-council charter the city judge 
must be a licensed attorney and be elected by popular vote for a term of four 
years. He can be removed for cause for the same causes and in the same manner 
provided for under the Ouster Law (T.c.A. Title 8, Chapter 47) , and the city 
council fills vacancies in the office of the city judge between elections. 
T, C.A. 6-33-102--6-33-103, 
Home Rule Charters 
T.C.A. Title 16, Chapter 17 contains provisions governing city courts in 
home rule municipalities, including their establishment, the creation of addi­
tional court divisions, and for the appointment and election of city judges. As 
was pointed out in the preceding section titled Jurisdiction of Municipal 
Courts, it is not clear whether those provisions are supplemental to, or super­
cede, those provisions in home rule charters governing municipal courts. It can 
be argued that they apply only to those municipal courts established under the 
authority of T.C.A., Title 16, Chapter 17. The problem with that argument is 
that the statute provides thst it applies to "all" home rule municipal courts. 
One of the provisions directs that the city judge "shall be appointed on 
the nomination of the mayor or chief executive officer, concurred in by the city 
council or other legislative body, but said judges so appointed shall run for 
election in the next general election." T.C.A. 16-17-102. No term of office is 
prescribed. The Tennessee Attorney General has opined that an amendment to the 
Lenoir City Charter providing that the municipal court judge be appointed by, 
and serve at the pleasure of, the city council, violates T.C.A. 16-17-102, OAG 
85-047 (2/21/85). 
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In any event, some home rule charters have adopted some or all of the pro­
Nisions of the general law charters, including those governing the appointment ·of municipal court judges; others may have adopted different provisions for the 
selection of the municipal judge. Probably under most home rule charter 
provisions, the municipal judge is appointed by, and serve at the will and 
pleasure of the municipal governing body, 
Miscellaneous 
Municipal judges are magi:1trates under a statute that defines the term to 
include "the mayor or city or municipal judge or chief officer and the recorder 
of any incorporated city or town," T.C.A. 38-4-101, 
Where the municipal judge is also the mayor, recorder or other municipal 
official, that combination of the executive and the judiciary may be subject to 
constitutional challenge. In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 490 U.S. 57 
( 1972), the U.S. Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution for the mayor to sit as city judge where the 
city derived a major portion of its income from fines, forfeitures, costs and 
fees. The financial responsibilities of the mayor may deprive him of the 
neutrality essential to impartial judgments. 
The city judge in municipalities over 1601000 population must be a lawyer 
licensed to practice law in Tunnessee. T.C.A. 17-l-106(d), 
Punalties and Punishment 
Private Act Charters 
Some private act municipal charters restrict municipal courts to levying a 
fine of not to exceed fifty dollars and make no provision for a jail sentence 
for the violation of municipal ordinances; some provide for a fine exceeding 
fifty dollars and/or a jail term of a certain period for such offenses. 
General Law Charters 
The general law mayor-aldermanic charter contains a list of corporate 
powers, one of which is "To impose and collect fines and forfeitures for 
breaches and violations of its ordinances ... " No jail term is provided. T.c.A. 
6-2-201(17). 
The general law uniform city manager-commission charter provides for a fine 
of fifty dollars and imprisonment not to exceed ninety days! T.C.A. 
6-19-101(29), A subsequent provision of the same charter gives the city judge 
the authority to "punish by fine or imprisonment or both for violation of city 
ordinances," That provision limits the fine to fifty dollars, but somewhat 
inconsistent with the term of imprisonment authorized above, provides that in 
default of payment of fines, · costs and forfe,itures the city judge is authorfaed 
to commit the offender to the workhouse for a maximum of thirty days for any 
one offense, T.C.A. 6-21-502, 
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The general law modified city manager-council charter, in a left-handed 
fashion, provides for the same penalt ies as the general law uniform city 
manager-commission charter. T.C.A. 6-33-101. 
Home Rule Municipalities 
Home rule municipalities have the authority to impose a thirty day jail 
sentence and a fift y dollar fine for the violation of municipal ordinances. 
T.c.A. 6-54-306, Some home rule municipalities have conflicting chart er provi­
sions which provide for more or less severe aut horit y, 
The Question of Fines or "Penalties Over $50 for Municipal Violations 
It is doubtful that any municipal court can levy a fine over $50 on a 
municipal ordinance violator. Article 6, Sect ion 14 of the Tennessee 
Constitut ion provides that 
No fine shall be laid on any citizen of this State that shall 
exceed fifty dollars, unless it shall be assessed by a jury 
of his peers, who shall assess the fine at t he t ime t hey find 
t he fact , if t hey t hink the fine should be more than fifty 
dollars. 
A trial court judge in a felony case has the authority to levy a fine 
exceeding fifty dollars on a defendant who has waived his right to have the fine 
assessed by  a jury. State v. Durso, 645 S,W.2d 753 (Tenn. 1983) ; State v. 
Purkey, 689 S.W.2d 196 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984), But there is no provision in 
t he Tennessee Constitution or statute for a trial by jury in mun.icipal court . 
The Tennessee Attorney General has opined that in t he absence of such authority 
a municipal court judge may not levy a fine exceeding fifty dollars for a muni­
cipal ordinance violation. OAG 84-291 ( 10/31/84). 
It has been held t hat municipal courts can impose a " penalt y , "  as opposed 
t o  a fine, exceeding fifty dollars on the grounds that municipal ordinance 
violation cases are civil act:tons rat her t han criminal prosecutions. O'Dell v, 
Knoxville, 54 Tenn. App. 59, 388 S.W.2d 150 (1964). O'Dell is probably not 
.'�ood law today in the face of Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson 
County v, Miles, 524 S.W.Zd 656 (1975). That case involved the question of 
whether a de novo retrial in circuit court of a case tried and dismissed in 
municipal court would constitute double jeopardy in violation of bot h the U.S. 
and Tennessee Constitut ions, Declaring that 01 Dell had already been impliedly 
overruled in earlier cases, t he Tennessee Supreme Court declared t hat 
• • •  a proceeding in a municipal court for the imposition of a 
fine upon a person for allegedly violating a city ordinance 
is criminal rather than civil in substance, in that, it seeks 
punishment to vindicate public justice and, t herefore, 
constitutes jeopardy under t he double jeopardy clauses of the 
Tennessee and F ederal Constitut ions • • •  
J I 
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Presumably, Miles also repudiates O'Del l's theory that "a penalty is not a 
fine" in municipal ordinance violation cases. 
The Question of Jail Sent:ences for Municipal Violations 
It is general l y  believed that municipal judges have no authority to 
impose a jail sentence for tht.! violation of a municipal ordinance, not­
withstanding municipal charter provisions to the contrary. Article I, Section 6 
of the Tennessee Constitution provides that " The right of trial by jury shall 
remain inviolate • • •  , "  and Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution 
declares "That in all criminal prosecutions, "the accused has certain rights, 
including, "in prosecutions by indictment or presentment, a speedy public 
trial , by an impartial jury ... " There are no provisions for a trial by jury in 
municipal courts in Tennessee. But it is not necessaril y the absence of such 
provisions that represent an impediment to the imposition of jail sentences for 
the violation of municipal ordinances. Those offenses which were "petty offen­
ses" at common law are not subject to the constitutional mandate of a jury 
trial. The impediment is that an offense for which a jail term can be imposed 
was not a petty offense at common law, The Tennessee Supreme Court in Willard 
v. State, 174 Tenn. 642, 130 S, W, 2d 99 (1939) said 
Our decisions hol d  that this constitutional provision 
[Artic le I, Section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution] protects 
the right of trial by jury onl y as it existed at common law 
insofar as it had been adopted and was in force in North 
Carolina, when the territory embraced in Tennessee was ceded 
by North Carolina to the Federal Government. [Citations 
omitted] , , ,  Misdemeanors not invol ving life or liberty may �-,, 
be tried under the constitution without a jury because_ such 
misdemeanors were triable under the common law without a jury. _ 
"i 
The Court went on to explain that in earlier cases it had distinguished between 
"misdemeanors generall y  and petty misdemeanors." The latter were misdemeanors 
"punishable by a fine of not more than $50 without imprisonment, except for non­
payment of fine and costs." Willard stands for the proposition that if life and 
l iberty can be taken by a municipal judge, the constitutional right to a jury 
trial attaches under Article I, Section 6. The corollary is that because there 
is no right to a jury trial in municipal court in Tennessee, a municipal judge 
cannot impose a jail sentence for the violation of a municipal ordinance. 
However, there is no apparent reason why the legislature could not authorize and 
provide for jury trials in municipal courts in Tennessee. 
In the more recent case of City of Gatlinburg v. Goans, 600 S, W, 735 ( Tenn. 
Ct. App. 1980), a defendant, relying upon both Sections 6 and 9 of Article I of 
the Tennessee Constitution, demanded a jury trial on appeal to circuit court 
from two convictions in municipal court for which he had been fined $20 in one 
case and $25 in another. Under the Gatlinburg City Charter an ordinance viola­
tor could be fined only fifty dol lars; no jail sentence cou l d  be imposed, The 
Court of Appeals, citing O'Del l and other cases, decl ared that "Our courts have 
consistentl y hel d that persoMcharged with petty offenses and violation of city 
ordinances are not, as a matter of right, entitled to a trial by jury under the 
provisions of the State or Federal Constitutions." The liberty of the 
defendant in that case was not in jeopardy. 
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What makes the answer to the question of whether a municipal judge can 
impose a jail sentence for th<, violation of a municipal ordinance slightly 
uncertain is that the Tenness<,e Supreme Court in Summers v. Thompson, without 
disapproval, declared that because municipal judges "have no authority to 
impose fines exceeding $50 or to impose extensive terms of imprisonment" they are 
essentially administrative judges. The Court had before it the general law 
municipal charters, one of which permits a municipal judge to jail a defendant 
for ninety days! But what the Court was considering when it made that statement 
was whether such authority constituted an exercise of judicial power under 
Article 6 of the Tennessee Constitution, not whether such authority triggered 
the right to a jury trial undnr Article l of the Tennessee Constitution. But 
that statement opens a crack on a door thought closed; perhaps on reflection the 
Court would close it again. 
Incidentally, under Rule 23, Tenn, R, Crim, P, " small offenses" may also be 
tried without a jury. Such offenses may include criminal contempt for which a 
jail term may be imposed, Robinson v. Gaines, 725 S.W.2d 692 (Tenn. Cr. App. 
1986), and other cases cited therein as well as in City of Gatlinburg v. Goans. 
'lowever, if the offense is punishable by imprisonment for over six months a U.S. 
Constitutional right to a jury trial attaches. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 
145 (1968); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U,S. 66 (1970). 
Although municipal courts probably cannot impose a jail term for the viola­
tion of municipal ordinances, it is generally agreed that they may impose a jail 
sentence for the willful refusal or neglect to pay a fine. The maximum prac­
tical sentence a municipal judge can impose for the refusal to pay a fine for 
the violation of a municipal ordinance is ten (10) days or one day for each five 
dollars of the fine. T.C.A. 40-24-104(a) (4) and (5)), However, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has held that an indigent defendant cannot be jailed for failure 
to pay a fine, Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 
u.s. 660, (1983). 
Collection of fines 
The Tennessee Attorney General has opined that a capias may be issued for 
a defendant who has refused to respond to a summons to show cause for failing to 
pay a fine previously imposed for the violation of a municipal ordinance. OAG 
U-87-28 (3/12/87). An unpaid municipal court fine may also be collected in the 
same manner as a judgment in a civil action. T, C.A. 40-24-105, A municipal 
court may also issue execution on judgments for fines and costs which remain 
unpaid for thirty days. T, C.A. 6-54-303. lf those processes are ever used, 
t hey are used infrequently. 
Contempt Powers 
A municipal court has the power, as do other courts, to punish for contempt. 
T.C.A, 16-1-103 contains a list of powers held by "every court, " including the 
power to enforce order necessary to prevent interruption, disturbance or 
hinderance of its proceedings, and to compel obedience to its orders, judgments 
and process. T.C.A, 16-1-103 provides that "For the effectual exercise of its 
powers, every court is vested with power to punish for contempt, as 
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provided for in this code, " Also see May v, Krichbaum, 152 Tenn, 416, 278 s.w. 
54 (1925) , The power of any court, including a municipal court, to punish for 
contempt is limited to the conduct listed in T, C, A, 29-9-102. Among other 
things, the conduct generally involves willful misbehavior in court, the willful 
disobedience to the commands of the court, T, C, A, 29-9-102, But the power of 
municipal courts to punish for contempt is limited to a fine of $10, T, C, A. 
29-9-103. 
Summers v. Thompson 
The At Will Status of Municipal Court Judges Under Attack 
The at will status under the general law uniform commission-manager form of 
government was challenged in Summers v, Thompson, (Tenn. Sup, Ct, , No, 23, filed 
May 23, 1988), In that case, the Soddy-Daisy city judge was summarily removed 
by the Soddy-Daisy board of commissioners after a feud between the board and the 
judge over the operation of the court and the disposition of DUI cases. The 
city judge challenged his dismissal on the grounds that the at will employment 
of city judges violated the separation of power provisions of Article II, 
Section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution. 
In a narrow ruling the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the authority of the 
Soddy-Daisy Board of Commissioners to terminate the city judge at will, 
It bypassed the constitutional issue raised by the city judge, and resolved the 
case on the construction of T.C, A, 6-21-501 and 16-18-101--102 (although it is 
difficult to figure out why the latter statute was even at issue), The Court 
was careful to note that 
Moreover, the holding of this case is expressly limited to 
those city courts th.at are not vested with concurrent 
jurisdiction with a General Sessions Court, which is an 
inferior court, under T, C.A, § 6-21-50l(b) or T, C, A. § 
16-18-101 (Supp. 1987), The jurisdiction of these city 
courts is wholly limited to traffic violations or city ordi­
nances, as the judges of these courts have no authority to 
impose fines exceeding $50 or to impose extensive terms of 
imprisonment and, as a practical matter, are essentially 
administrative judges, Such a judge is not cloaked with the 
powers of a judge of an inferior court within the meaning of 
Article VI [of the Sonstitution of Tennessee). 
T, C, A. 6-21-501 is one of the provisions of the general law uniform city 
manager-commission charter governing the city court, It contains two 
subsections: Subsection (a) provides for a city court presided over by a city 
judge who has jurisdiction only over ordinance violations and who serves at the 
will and ple.asure of the board of commissioners; Subsection (b) provides for 
those city court which fall into certain population brackets to be presided over 
by a city judge who has concurrent jurisdiction with courts of general session 
and who also serves at the wl.11 and pleasure of the board of commissioners, 
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T.C.A. 16-18-101 authorizes the governing body of any municipality 
ing a mayor's court or a court presided over by a recorder, and no other pro­
:lsion for a city judge, to provide by ordinance for the office of city judge. 
However, it does not confer concurrent jurisdiction on the court. T.C.A. 
16-18-102(3) provides that the city judge serves at the pleasure of the muni­
cipal governing body. 
Thus, Summers is legal authority to terminate city judges at will in onl y 
those T.C.A. 6-21-SOl(a) courts and in those city courts established under 
T, C, A. 16-18-101. Neither class of courts has jurisdiction concurrent with that 
of a court of general sessions. But presumably, under the logic of Summers, 
municipal judges who do not have concurrent jurisdiction under private act char­
ters can be terminated at will. 
The Summers Court coul d  find only two municipalities under the general law 
uniform city manager-commission charter which fal l within the population 
brackets required under T.C.A, 6-21-SOl(b) to give their city courts jurisdic­
tion concurrent with that of a court of general sessions: St, Joseph and 
Loretto, in Lawrence County. In other words, Soddy-Daisy had a T.C.A. 
6-21-SOl(a) city court, which had no concurrent jurisdiction, rather than a 
T, C, A., Section 6-21-SOl(b) city court, which does have concurrent jurisdiction. 
" [ W) ithout any concurrent jurisdiction, a city judge of a subsection (a) court 
does not exercise constitutional judicial power," declared the Court, 
Summers And The Future of Municipal Courts 
That is the limit of Summers. Technical ly, that case leaves until another 
day the question of whether city judges who have concurrent jurisdiction under 
.!!!!. city charter can be removed at wil l ,  but it unquestionabl y  serves blunt 
notice that in any future case invol ving a chal l enge to the removal of a city 
court judge who has concurrent jurisdiction, municipal judges with such juris­
diction will be found to be judges of inferior courts within the meaning of 
Article VI of the Tennessee Constitution. 
The significance of such a holding is seen in Article VI, Section 4 of the 
Tennessee Constitution, which provides that 
The judges of the Circuit and Chancery Courts, and of other 
inferior courts shall be elected by the qualified voters of 
the district or circuit to which they are to be assigned. 
Every Judge of such Courts shall be thirty years of age, and 
shall before his election, have been a resident of the State 
for five years and of the circuit or district one year. His 
term of service shal l be eight years. [Emphasis mine] 
The logical outcome of that language is that where the constitutional 
issues raised in Summers are met squarely in a future case, the Court will hold 
that municipal judges having concurrent jurisdiction with that of a sessions 
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court judge must be elected to an eight year term and meet the other qualif ica­
t ions contained in Article VI, Section 4. In fact, in a strong concurring 
opinion, Justice Drowota (who also wrote the majority opinion) declared that he 
would hold that city judges who exercise concurrent jurisdiction with inferior 
courts "must be elected for a term of eight (8) years as required by Article VI, 
Section 4, and may not be removed except pursuant to the Cons ti tut ion of 
Tennessee." That holding appears to merely await the right case. 
It is difficult to predict the practical implications such a ruling would 
have for municipal courts in Tennessee. None of the general law charters and 
probably none of the private act and home rule charters provide for a term of 
office and qualifications for the city judge consistent with that required of 
judges of inferior courts under Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee 
Constitution. Because there is presently no legislative authority in the 
general law or in any charter, perhaps excepting the home rule charter, for a 
municipal judge to be elected to an eight year term and meet the other qualif i­
cations of Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution the Tennessee 
General Assembly would have to legislate such authority. A home rule municipa­
lity might, under the authority of T.C.A. Title 16, Chapter 17, or by an amend­
ment to its charter by ordinance, provide that the municipal judge be elected 
to an eight year term and meet the other terms of Article VI, Section 4. T.C.A. 
Title 16, Chapter 17, while it provides for the election of the city judge 
(after the initial appointment:), it provides for no term of office; therefore, 
an eight year term would be open to the municipality under that statute. 
It is unlikely that the Tennessee Supreme Court would declare sitting muni­
cipal judges having concurrenl: jurisdiction "elected" for terms of eight years. 
Such a declaration would intrude on the rights of the legislature and the elec­
torate, respectively, to create inferior courts, and to elect the judges of such 
courts. 
A possible course open to the Tennessee Supreme Court would be to hold 
unconstitutional and void the grant of concurrent jurisdiction to municipal 
courts whose judges are not elected for terms of eight years and meet the other 
requirements of Article VI, Section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution. See 
Waters v. State ex rel Schmutzer, 583 S,W.2d 756 (1979). That would be Justice 
Drow at a 1 s approach. 
What would be the status of all the cases adjudicated by the municipal 
courts in Tennessee under the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction found to have 
been unconstitutionally bestowed upon them? Arguably the judges of those courts 
would be de facto judges and the adjudications would stand. In Waters the 
Tennessee Supreme Court was faced with resolving a competing claim to the office 
of juvenile court judge by Larry Waters, the Sevier County executive, and Henry 
Ogle, a local attorney. Waters, who was 26 years of age, claimed the office by 
virtue of holding the office of county executive. Henry Ogle claimed the office 
through his appointment as judge pro tempore by Harold Atchley, the county judge 
pro tempore. Upon the death of the county judge, Atchley had been appointed 
county judge pro tempore by the county court to serve until the next general 
election. Atchley, who was not an attorney,, declared himself incompetent to 
serve as juvenile court judge, and requested the Sevier County Bar association 
to assist in the election of a juvenile court judge pro tempore pursuant to 
T.C.A, 17-225 [now T.C.A. 17-2-118), The Sevier County Bar Association elected 
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enry Ogle, who, by order of Atchley, assumed the office of Sevier County 
Juvenile Judge. Ogle served as the juvenile judge from April 23, 1978 until 
September 1, 1978 when Waters assumed office as the county executive. But even 
after Waters assumed office, Ogle claimed to hold the office of juvenile court 
judge, on the grounds that Waters was constitutional ly disqualified from hol ding 
that off ice, 
The Court pointed to T,C,A, 5-601 through 5-606 [ now 5-6-101 through 
5-6-106) which govern the qualifications and term of county executives in 
Tennessee, They provide, among other things, that county executives must be at 
l east 25 years of age, meet certain residency requirements, and are elected for 
a term of four years, In addition, under T,C,A, 5-606, the county executive 
was vested with "the judicial authority formerly exercised by the county judge, 
county chairman, or other such elected official of county government. ,," [That 
statute, now T. C. A. 5-6-106, was subsequently amended to delete that authority 
in response to the hol ding in this case], But a juvenile court is an inferior 
court within the meaning of Article VI of the Tennessee Constitution, and judges 
of inferior courts must be elected for a term of eight years and be thirty years 
o f  age under Article VI, Section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution. Neither the 
term of office for county executive established under T,C, A. 5-601 [now 5-6-101] 
nor Waters age (26), met those constitutional requirements; therefore, the grant 
o f  "judicial authority formerly exercised by the county judge, county chairman, 
or other elected official of county government, " was unconstitutional . 
But while Waters was not a de jure juvenile court judge he was a de facto 
juvenile court judge by virtue of his induction into the off ice of county execu­
tive, and in that capacity his acts as juvenile court judge were valid, declared 
the Court. 
The Court treated Ogle' s "election" to the office of juvenile court judge 
as if it were valid, but had "grave doubts" whether Atchley's declaration that 
he was not competent to serve as juvenile court judge justified holding the 
election. However, the Court declined to specifical l y  decide both that issue, 
and what it called the " secondary question" of whether Ogle "if not a de Jure 
juvenile court judge pro tempore, was, in view of his election by the bar and 
his apparent acceptance as juvenile court judge by the bar, and the quarterly 
county court •• , a de facto juvenile court judge pro tempore. " Those issues 
wou l d  be decided when and if they were raised by litigants who had appeared 
before Ogle during the period April 23, 1978 to September 1, 1978, 
The de facto judge approach of Waters seems both a legal l y  sound and prac­
tical way to handle jurisdictional challenges to the decisions of municipal 
judges operating under an unconstitutional grant of concurrent jurisdiction. 
